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THE UNIVERSE OF SCIENCE. THE ARCHITECTONIC IDEAS OF SCIENCE, 
SCIENCES AND THEIR PARTS IN KANT 
 
M. Lewin1 
 
I argue that Kant has developed a broad systematic account of the architectonic functionality 
of pure reason that can be used and advanced in contemporary contexts. Reason, in the narrow 
sense, is responsible for the picture of a well-ordered universe of science consisting of architectonic 
ideas of science, sciences and parts of sciences. In the first section (I), I show what Kant means by 
the architectonic ideas by explaining and interrelating the concepts of (a) the faculty of reason, (b) 
ideas (as principles), (c) method, and (d) sciences of reason. Thereafter (II), I think through his 
holistic understanding of science and scientific progress and suggest differentiating between four 
levels of use of architectonic ideas, drawing on the metaphor of a well-structured universe as 
imagined by Kant in his work on the Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens. I also 
claim that each possible idea of reason can be (apart from its primary function) additionally 
regarded as a fourth-level architectonic concept when explicitly conceived as an object of (e.g. 
philosophical) studies, i.e. from a mere methodological perspective. In the final section (III), I 
unveil the potential of Kant’s theory by pointing out how this architectonic methodological function 
of pure reason is tacitly used in Karl-Otto Apel’s contemporary philosophical research programme. 
 
Keywords: reason, ideas, architectonics, sciences, systematicity, use of reason in 
contemporary philosophy. 
 
Introduction 
 
While (1) the Kantian philosophy of science, (2) the “Architectonic” chapter of the Critique of 
Pure Reason and (3) his theory of regulative ideas have become the focus of recent research,2 the 
topic of “architectonic ideas” has not received enough attention and has been addressed only in 
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passing. Although, admittedly, not a few authors mention the Kantian notion of ideas of sciences, 
they are rather concerned with adjacent topics than with an in-depth exploration and explanation of 
the concrete functionality of pure reason regarding this kind of ideas.3 The topics include the 
systematicity and the interrelation of the sciences (cf. McRae, 1957), the relation between the 
sciences and the (practical) ends of reason (cf. Sturm, 2020; Gava, 2014), the historical roots of the 
Kantian conceptual framework (cf. Switzer, 2014; Sturm, 2009, pp. 131-146) etc. I want to choose a 
different path and focus on the architectonic functionality, capability and procedure of reason (in 
the narrow sense) per se.4 I argue that Kant has developed an account of the methodological 
functionality of pure reason regarding the scientific practice of systematic planning, developing, 
acquiring and ordering of knowledge under the guidance of architectonic ideas, which is broader 
and richer in content than often presented in Kant research. Moreover, I aim to show that it is not – 
so to speak – a mere “exhibit” in the “museum of the history of philosophy”, but an important and 
plausible theoretical endeavour that can be applied and advanced in contemporary contexts. I will 
proceed as follows: First (I), I will explain the basic concepts I will be working with: (a) the faculty 
of reason, (b) ideas (as principles), (c) method, and (d) sciences of reason. After that (II), I will 
distinguish four levels in the use of architectonic ideas, using the metaphor of a well-structured 
universe as imagined by Kant in his work on the Universal Natural History and Theory of the 
Heavens. In the final section (III), I will show through the example of Karl-Otto Apel’s 
transcendental pragmatism how the methodological function of pure reason, which deserves its own 
proper account, is tacitly used in contemporary philosophy. 
 
I 
 
Kant states in the “Architectonic” chapter of his first Critique and in his lectures on logic, that 
“[i]n all sciences, above all in those of reason, the idea of the science is its universal abstract or 
outline, hence the extension of all the cognitions that belong to it. Such an idea of the whole – the 
first thing one has to look to in a science, and which one has to seek – is architectonic, as, e.g., the 
idea of jurisprudence” (Log, AA 09, p. 93; Kant, 1992, p. 591). Whether we are dealing with 
systematic knowledge of natural sciences, jurisprudence or philosophy, we have to recognize and 
 
3  The ideas of sciences are not to be confused with the transcendental ideas, whose number is limited and whose 
function (as regulative ideas) is completely different. They are also not merely a subtopic to “regulative ideas” in 
general. For a complete and tabular overview over the (seven) kinds of ideas in Kant and the corresponding different 
functions of reason in the narrow sense see Lewin (in press). Some of the ongoing results of my studies were also 
published in Lewin (2020) and some of the initial deliberations in Lewin (2018). 
4  I herewith follow the Kantian distinction between the reason in the narrow sense (which is exclusively 
concerned with ideas and principles of higher order) and the reason in the wider sense (as the whole of the rational 
faculties including the understanding and the reason in the narrow sense). By speaking simply of “reason” in some 
passages of this paper, I will mean the reason in the first sense. 
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presuppose that in “every system there must be an idea as the whole which determines the 
arrangement and the purpose, and this idea represents the systematic unity”5 (V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24, 
p. 530; transl. M L). Kant develops in these and similar passages on “the art of systems” (KrV, 
A 832 / B 860; Kant, 1998, p. 691) a certain methodology and understanding of how scholars 
produce and acquire systematic knowledge using their faculty of reason in the narrow sense. For 
Kant, the term “idea” is strictly reserved for designating the highest and purest kind of mental 
representations. In his metaphysics of mental powers, reason in the narrow sense, alternatively 
called “the faculty of principles”, is responsible for creating and implementing this kind of 
representations to guide our will and our understanding. Due to this function, they can be regarded 
as presuppositions, tasks, purposes, problems, or in general: principles of higher order that reason 
inevitably imposes on us in several different fields of acting and knowing. The term “principle” is 
ambiguous in Kant. It may mean – according to the German word “Grundsatz” – a certain binding 
rule based on a cognition and in form of a sentence. The principles of understanding are examples 
of this. In cases, however, when it is used interchangeably with “idea” (cf. KrV, A 569 / B 597, 
A 619 / B 647, A 672 / B 700; Kant, 1998, pp. 552, 577, 606 etc.), it indicates – based on the Latin 
“principium” (beginning) – a certain starting point imagined (vorgestellt) or projected by reason in 
the narrow sense. In such cases, a principle is a leap ahead, an anticipation of a result that all efforts 
of understanding in combining different elements of cognitions should lead to. This leap produces a 
gap between the actual (conditioned) and the imagined (condition), whereby reason gives the latter 
the form of absoluteness and priority over the former, and commands the understanding and the will 
to act according to the principle and to bridge this gap. For this purpose, reason formulates maxims; 
it expands representations such as the infinity of the universe to sentences, such as continue the 
process of discovery and understanding of the universe as if it were infinite (cf. KrV, A 672 / B 700; 
Kant, 1998, p. 606; A 685 / B 713; Kant, 1998, p. 613). 
The general definition of idea (or principle) that Kant gives us at the beginning of the 
“Transcendental Dialectic”, is of a concept of reason “to which no congruent object can be given in 
senses” (KrV, A 327 / B 383; Kant, 1998, p. 402). It is, however, bound to the terminology of his 
theoretical philosophy (to the opposition “concept of reason” (A) vs. “object given in senses” (B)) 
and is not an all-encompassing definition. Kant will slightly change it after examining several other 
functions of the faculty of principles in different fields of human acting, especially with respect to 
the exceptional status of aesthetical ideas. An example for a more general version can be found in 
his Lectures on Pedagogy: “An idea is nothing more than a concept of perfection which is not yet to 
 
5  „In jedem System muß eine Idee als das Ganze seyn, die die Einteilung und den Zweck bestimmt, und diese 
Idee macht die systematische Einheit aus.“ 
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be found in experience”6 (Päd, AA 09, p. 444; transl. M L). The basic determination expressed in 
this definition is that there is an assumption of something so perfect (demanding, pure, and 
complete) (=A), that a particular something (=B) does not meet the posited demands. For example, 
an aesthetical idea like the beautiful does not really originate from our reason, but from our faculty 
of imagination (Einbildungskraft), as Kant states in the third Critique. It falls, however, under the 
general definition of ideas, because the imagination of beautiful is so elusive that our understanding 
cannot fully reach and describe it (cf. KU, AA 05, pp. 313-317, 342-344; Kant, 2000, pp. 191-195, 
217-219). Analogously, when Kant speaks of ideas of sciences in the chapter on the architectonic of 
pure reason in his first Critique, he differentiates between (A) a pure concept of a science and (B) a 
schema, which contains the outline and a subdivision of the elements of a science. Their 
interrelation, which can be also described in terms of a perfect archetype and a not-fully-appropriate 
image of the same thing (ectype) (cf. KrV, A 838 / B 866; Kant, 1998, p. 694), underlie all sciences 
of reason: “Nobody attempts to establish a science without grounding it on an idea. But in its 
elaboration the schema, indeed even the definition of the science which is given right at the outset, 
seldom corresponds to the idea; for this lies in reason like a seed, all of whose parts still lie very 
involuted and are hardly recognizable even under microscopic observation” (KrV, A 834 / B 862; 
Kant, 1998, p. 692). Hence, a pure concept of a science is (A) a vague and elusive idea, which can 
be given only partially in concreto, and it is (B) in a description and systematic schema of a science, 
which never completely matches the original representation or the archetype. 
I suggest calling these scientific-praxis-related ideas – to clearly distinguish them from the 
“transcendental”, “theoretical”, “practical”, “aesthetical”, “religious”, “political” etc. principles of 
reason in the narrow sense – architectonic (cf. Log, AA 09, p. 93; Kant, 1992, p. 591; KrV, A 833 / 
B 861; Kant, 1998, p. 692), or methodological ideas. They are used to create systematic unities of 
knowledge, especially, as Kant states, in the sciences of reason (cf. Log, AA 09, p. 93; Kant, 1992, 
p. 591). The “Architectonic” chapter of the first Critique, as well as the related passages on the “art 
of systems” do not only answer the question of how a metaphysical system can be built out of the 
material thoroughly examined and chosen by a transcendental philosopher, but also contain aspects 
of Kant’s general philosophy of rational sciences. The procedure of creating (A) methodological 
(architectonic) ideas and (B) basic outlines is common among transcendental philosophy (i.e. 
critique, as part of metaphysics), metaphysics, anthropology, ethics, jurisprudence, natural sciences 
etc. They all are (1) sciences (in Kant’s broad understanding of the term “science”),7 which are (2) 
rational in the sense that they are not a mere (empirical) accumulation of facts, but make up a (3) 
 
6  „Eine Idee ist nichts anderes, als der Begriff von einer Vollkommenheit, die sich in der Erfahrung noch nicht 
vorfindet.“ 
7  For a detailed analysis of Kant’s concept of science see Sturm (2009, pp. 128-182). 
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system under (4) the general purposes, essential ends and principles of reason,8 and (5) 
corresponding methods. The points (3)-(5) are crucial for certainty and universality of a science. In 
Kant’s peculiar and – against the backdrop of the previous history of philosophy – innovative view, 
a scientific system is not and should not be based on a mere compilation of parts (the original and 
general meaning of the Ancient Greek “σύστημα” (a whole compounded of parts) is based on 
“συνιστάναι” (to combine, to unite, to set something together)). Metaphorically speaking, it is 
neither enough to collect similar puzzle pieces nor to unite them – even using a strict, e.g. 
mathematical, method.9 A scientist has and should have an idea of reason as a preliminary vague 
picture of the whole puzzle, and determine its purpose, before combining and ordering the pieces to 
a whole of a science. An example for this is Kant’s own Idea for a Universal History with a 
Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784). In this essay (A) he develops a concept of a historical science based 
on the idea that human reason – being one of our natural capacities – is predestined to reach its full 
potential throughout the course of history. And (B) he sketches and points out several important 
moments that should be considered during the realisation of this project. Without (A) and (B), 
history as a science would be nothing more than knowledge of existing historical facts.  
The architectonic or methodological principles are therefore inevitable conditions in the field 
of sciences of reason for the construction and acquisition of systematic knowledge. The 
understanding of their functions is a part of the general methodology of scientific systems. A 
method, in theoretical (architectonic) perspective, is for Kant “a procedure according to principles 
of reason, through which alone the manifold of a cognition can become a system” (KpV, AA 05, 
p. 151; Kant, 2002, p. 189). This is neither to be confounded with methods in practical perspective 
nor with methods in empirical sciences. At the end of Critique of Practical Reason we find a 
methodology which deals with the pedagogical and didactical issues of “founding and cultivating 
genuine moral attitudes” (KpV, AA 05, p. 153; Kant, 2002, p. 191). The theoretical (architectonic) 
methodology is, however, in the Kantian view a part of logic, which examines ways to operate with 
systematic scientific knowledge. Its main goal is the logical perfection of cognition, which “consists 
in its distinctness, thoroughness, and systematic ordering into the whole of a science” (Log, AA 09, 
p. 140; Kant, 1992, p. 630). This “systematic ordering into the whole of a science” – if it should be 
more than a mere accumulation of parts – is, above all, based upon the capacity of reason in the 
narrow sense to create and implement architectonic ideas.  
 
II 
 
8  The relationship between the practical ends of reason and architectonic unities is discussed in detail in Gava 
(2014) and Sturm (2020). 
9  For Kant’s critical attitude towards the mathematical method of construction of systems (by example of Wolff 
and Meier) see Meer (2019, pp. 151-154). 
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If Kant is right, and this procedure is common to all rational sciences, and if we take his 
position as not a mere fact in the history of philosophy and an outdated theory, but as a research 
programme and a potentially helpful suggestion to understand the logic of scientific practice, we 
need a more systematic account of the methodological use of pure reason. Based on the preliminary 
terminological clarifications in Part (I), I want to answer the question whether there are different 
“planes” or “levels” in the use of methodological ideas. Are, e.g., the ideas of the whole of 
jurisprudence or of the universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose embedded into some general 
structure of science with principles above and below them? Are they boxes inside a bigger box and 
contain smaller boxes inside them, or are they just sketches on a blank paper? In answering this 
question, I will think through Kant’s holistic account of science, the relation of methodological 
principles to other kinds of ideas of reason and the possibility of differentiating between grades of 
growth of knowledge under the guidance of a methodological idea. 
There can be no doubt that Kant’s inquiry into the nature of science is led by his interest in the 
possibility of metaphysics and its relation to empirical and historical sciences. It would, however, be 
a mistake to assume that his systematology is based upon an equation of “science” with 
“metaphysics” in the sense that the latter (if possible) would be – like in the Cartesian tree metaphor 
– the roots of all other sciences. Kant’s image is rather – as presented in his pre-critical work on the 
Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens – the one of the universe containing smaller 
systems of celestial objects within bigger ones.10 Science is a “system of systems”, (A) a general 
idea of the whole of human scientific knowledge with (B) a certain sketch or preunderstanding of 
the relation of its parts, i. e. of sciences.11 Philosophy, metaphysics (as part of philosophy), 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose, jurisprudence etc.  
 
are not merely each articulated for themselves in accordance with an idea but are rather 
all in turn purposively united with each other as members of a whole in a system of human 
cognition, and allow an architectonic to all human knowledge, which at the present time, 
 
10  In his pre-critical work Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens (1755) Kant was concerned with 
what he called the “systematic constitution of the universe” (NTH, AA 01, p. 246; Kant, 2015, p. 214) as a work of God, 
“a great architect” (cf. NTH, AA 01, p. 256; Kant, 2015, p. 222). To understand the structure of the universe, Kant was 
thinking in analogies (cf. NTH, AA 01, pp. 253-258; Kant, 2015, pp. 220-223). Just as planets in the Solar System orbit 
around the Sun, all stars in the Milky Way must in their turn move around their common gravitational centre – and the 
same applies to the galaxies, the “Milky Ways”, themselves. The architectonic ideas are such gravitational centres with 
systematic knowledge circling around them. While I suggest differentiating between four planes in the suggested 
metaphor of the universe of science (created, and therefore comprehensible by human reason), Kant, in this text, was 
however thinking of an overwhelming unimaginable infinite progression of analogically constructed unities (created by 
God). 
11  For interesting remarks on Kant’s idea of the whole of the science as a “vague idea” see also McRae (1957). 
Unfortunately, McRae did not inquire into its concrete structure. 
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since so much material has already been collected or can be taken from the ruins of 
collapsed older edifices, would not merely be possible but would not even be very difficult 
(KrV, A 835 / B 863; Kant, 1998, pp. 692-693). 
 
The faculty of principles in its methodological or architectonic use is therefore concerned with 
the most general, systematic and complete image of scientific knowledge. This is reason’s highest 
and most demanding task in this field. Subsequently, (1) if science is a system of systems, and (2) if 
a system is a whole of cognitions based on an architectonic principle, and (3) if the highest and 
complete notion were the idea of the whole of all possible human knowledge, there must be a 
systematic subdivision of it into smaller systems under ideas of reason. I suggest differentiating 
between four levels of methodological principles (“ideas within idea” in “system of systems”) to get 
an overview of the functionality of reason in the narrow sense in its architectonic use. The first and 
highest level of representation of scientific systematicity with the above-described relation of 
archetype / ectype or idea / sketch is the idea of science as such. Concepts of sciences like 
philosophy or jurisprudence are just ideas of systems among other systems or “galaxies” in the 
universe of science, and are, therefore, on the second level of the use of methodological pure 
reason. In Kant’s understanding, philosophy (just as jurisprudence, as cited above) “is a mere idea 
of a possible science, which is nowhere given in concreto, but which one seeks to approach in 
various ways until the only footpath, much overgrown by sensibility, is discovered, and the hitherto 
unsuccessful ectype, so far as it has been granted to humans, is made equal to the archetype” (KrV, 
A 838 / B 866; Kant, 1998, p. 694). 
Kant’s own “sketch” of the idea of philosophy is based on a distinction between pure 
(cognition from pure reason) and empirical (rational cognition from empirical concepts) philosophy. 
The former is subdivided into propaedeutic (critique or transcendental philosophy, which is also 
metaphysics in a wider sense) and metaphysics (see KrV, A 841 / B 869; Kant, 1998, p. 696). The 
idea of metaphysics is, therefore, not to be confounded with the general idea of philosophy. I 
suggest – to make it clear – allocating all methodological ideas of the parts of sciences (including 
the parts inside the parts of sciences), i.e. of “stellar groupings” within “galaxies”, to the third level. 
On this level we find such archetypes/ectypes as (1) “idea of metaphysics” (KrV, A 849 / B 877; 
Kant, 1998, p. 700), alternatively called “idea of a philosophy of pure reason” (KrV, A 847 / B 874; 
Kant, 1998, p. 699) or idea of a science which is “as old as speculative human reason” (KrV, A 842 / 
B 870; Kant, 1998, p. 696); (2) “idea of transcendental philosophy” (KrV, A 01; Kant, 1998, p. 127) 
behind the Critique of Pure Reason which evolves throughout Kant’s works;12 (3) “idea and 
 
12  For a concise overview of the development of Kant’s concept of transcendental philosophy see Förster (2016, 
pp. 2319-2325). 
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necessity of a metaphysics of morals” (MS, AA 06, p. 214; Kant, 1991, p. 43); (4) the above-
mentioned “idea of universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose”; (5) ideas “of a Right for all 
nations (ius gentium)”, of “cosmopolitan Right (ius cosmopoliticum)”, of public law etc. (MS, 
AA 06, p. 311; Kant, 1991, p. 123).  
These “stellar groupings” within the “galaxies” of “sciences of reason” can be subdivided into 
smaller unities (to stay with the metaphor of the universe of science: “planetary systems”). This 
may be considered as the ground-level of the architectonic use of pure reason. How far does it 
reach? A system of knowledge is a system of cognitions under a methodological principle of reason 
((A) archetype and (B) outline). The fourth and final level is reached if ideas which construct a part 
of a science cannot be subdivided into smaller ones and can be only interconnected in a network. An 
example for this is the idea of pure thinking. Kant states clearly that the idea of transcendental logic 
as a part of transcendental philosophy is based upon this concept: 
 
In the expectation, therefore, that there can perhaps be concepts that may be related to 
objects a priori, not as pure or sensible intuitions but rather merely as acts of pure thinking, 
that are thus concepts but of neither empirical nor aesthetic origin, we provisionally 
formulate the idea of a science of pure understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, 
by means of which we think objects completely a priori. Such a science, which would 
determine the origin, the domain, and the objective validity of such cognitions, would have 
to be called transcendental logic […] (KrV, A 57 / B 81; Kant, 1998, p. 196). 
 
The pure thinking as an idea of spontaneous creation of concepts and principles a priori by the 
faculties of understanding and reason is a fourth-level methodological concept. The transcendental 
logic is a unity of cognitions related to the functionality of pure thinking – e.g. the procedure and 
number of inferences of pure reason in the “Transcendental Dialectic”. Accordingly, the idea of 
pure will (of practical freedom, of pure practical reason) is a heuristic key concept behind the 
Critique of Practical Reason and Metaphysics of Morals, and is a gravitational centre of 
corresponding cognitions. 
Following these thoughts a little further, I would go so far as to say that all pure concepts of 
reason we encounter inside and outside Kantian works may be additionally considered as 
methodological (architectonic) principles under the condition that they are explicitly conceived of 
as objects of a study (e.g. of a philosopher). I will try to explain this by an example. The 
transcendental ideal (God, in a merely theoretical perspective) in the Critique of Pure Reason is 
either a dogmatic transcendent concept (if the power of judgement is deluded) or a regulative 
principle. In the latter case a natural scientist may systematically analyse nature by following the 
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heuristic idea of the purposiveness of everything – as if it were created by a higher reason. From a 
mere methodological point of view, e.g. of Kant as a philosopher, the “Ideal of Pure Reason” is a 
chapter within the “Transcendental Dialectic” and – as a pure concept – an object of study. In this 
perspective, it expresses a systematic unity of cognitions regarding the inferences and the categories 
used to think this concept, the mistakes of the power of judgement, the regulative functionality etc. 
Correspondingly, the idea of beautiful is used by an artist directly and not – e.g. by a philosopher 
who works in aesthetics to understand this concept – as an object of studies. In the same way, the 
invisible church is an example for religious concepts of reason, but from the perspective of Kant as 
a scholar this idea is necessary to analyse possibility of Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. 
The ideas of state, state constitution and social contract (often formulated as “idea of the original 
contract” in Kant) may belong to judicial or political practice, but for a legal scholar or a legal 
philosopher they are archetypes of unities of knowledge (with competing ectypes). 
Following my suggestion to bring order into the Kantian account of architectonic use of pure 
reason by differentiating between four levels of methodological principles, these could be possible 
examples of sets of “ideas within idea” and corresponding “systems within system” in the universe 
of science: 
(I) idea of science – (II) idea of philosophy – (III) idea of pure philosophy, idea of 
metaphysics, idea of transcendental philosophy, idea of transcendental logic – (IV) – idea of pure 
thinking 
(I) idea of science – (II) idea of jurisprudence – (III) idea of public law – (IV) idea of social 
contract  
The universe of science is growing and expanding if progress is made on these four levels. 
Kant speaks in this regard of a “self-unfolding of reason” (my translation for: “sich bloß 
auswickelnden Vernunft” — KrV, A 835 / B 863; cf. Kant, 1998, p. 692) (a term that will be later 
prominently used by Hegel in a different way),13 Reason in the narrow sense leaps ahead and 
creates vague heuristic concepts that guide the will and the understanding of a scholar (regardless of 
whether she is a researcher, lecturer or student). On the one hand, the growth of knowledge in 
rational sciences is dependent on this function. On the other, there are the successful and 
unsuccessful attempts to define these concepts and to develop fitting systems of cognition (ectypes) 
which lead to a clearer conceivability of architectonic ideas. The progress in rational sciences is 
therefore based on this interplay of archetypes and ectypes, and the history of a science – as Kant 
 
13  Nuzzo (1995) points out quite rightly that Hegel’s concept of the (self-unfolding) idea (also called: absolute 
idea, reason, reasonability, subject-object etc.) rather has the methodological sense of an ideal of a philosophical system. 
It is not to be confounded with the transcendental ideal (representation of God). As far as I can see, by differentiating – 
as the majority of Kant scholars usually do – between only three types of ideas in Kant (transcendental, moral and 
aesthetical, cf. Nuzzo, 1995, p. 97), she does not thematise the architectonic (methodological) ideas and misses this 
interesting passage at the end of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
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shows by the example of metaphysics in the last chapter of his first Critique – is a history of fallen 
edifices which contributed to a general understanding and evolution of an idea. Hence, it is possible 
to differentiate between grades in the growth of knowledge in relation to an idea as well as between 
grades of clarity in the ideas on all four levels. Philosophy, e.g., is an ideal concept of what is yet to 
be discovered, and third- and fourth-level ideas and systems can still bring a change into this 
concept. This is the dynamic holistic picture of scientific practice that Kant gives us with his 
thoughts on the logic of scientific research (in his architectonic methodology). 
 
III 
 
If we want to be something more than a “plaster cast” (KrV, A 836 / B 864; Kant, 1998, 
p. 893) of Kant’s mind, we should examine whether the theory of architectonic ideas is still a 
reliable, helpful and well-grounded position. Ironically, many post-idealistic authors in philosophy 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, who explicitly claim to have “overcome” the Kantian 
(“subjective”, “outdated” etc.) standpoint, tacitly use their reason in the narrow sense to create their 
philosophical projects. I will show this using the example of Karl-Otto Apel’s transcendental 
pragmatism. Apel and Habermas try to find a way to make use of what Kant calls the “ideas of 
reason” in contemporary contexts by embedding them into the structures of communicative 
rationality and everyday life practice and understanding them as “detranscendentalised” idealising 
presuppositions (see Habermas, 2003, pp. 83-130).14 This is – just as any philosophical project – 
per se a legitimate and autonomous research programme. But a deeper look at the corresponding 
texts and passages reveals that both communicative rationalists (1) are aware of only a very limited 
number of kinds of ideas (see, e.g., the list in Habermas, 2003, p. 87), (2) which may be partially 
the reason for the poor articulation of their actual functionality (see the point (a) below) as well as 
(3) for the unnecessary polemics against Kant and ad hoc modifications (see the footnote below). In 
what follows, I will not be concerned with an in-depth analysis and discussion of Apel’s account of 
ideas or his position in general. My goal is simply to point out some of his shortcuts that undermine 
the actual power and importance of Kant’s set of theories regarding the ideas of reason. One can, of 
course, try to “detranscendentalise” the architectonic ideas and embed them into the communicative 
acting and rationality (if one follows the highly problematic thesis that transcendentality excludes 
communicative acting and if one does not recognise that for Kant scientific practice (e.g. the work 
on the idea of metaphysics) is a collective enterprise of the community of former,  contemporary 
 
14 Apel would prefer to speak of a transformation of transcendental philosophy in this context (see 
Apel, 1994a, pp. 235-237). 
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and future scholars), but one has first to know that there are architectonic ideas, that they are 
actually used, and understand their concrete functions. 
For Apel, to speak of faculties (powers) of understanding and reason is completely redundant 
and it simply does not fit the contemporary logic of science. The older theoretical models of reason 
must be replaced – and herein he follows, like Habermas, the pragmatist tradition, Weber, 
Wittgenstein and Popper – by a general concept of rationality, and primarily: communicative 
rationality. The concept of transcendentality receives a new, “updated” meaning in this context. The 
“conditions of a possible experience” are not to be found in the subject and its mind, but in the acts 
of communication, as rules and presuppositions, imagined and anticipated by every participant in a 
discourse. Since nobody can in any way avoid or seriously abstract from these rules and 
presuppositions, regardless of whether she is in a poly-, dia- or monologue, Apel concludes that an 
ultimate grounding of rationality, ethics and philosophy as such is possible. The authors, however, 
who work within the paradigm of subjective philosophy of mind and epistemology are – like its 
initiator Descartes – prone to “abstractive fallacies”: they speak of a “transcendental apperception” 
(Kant) or of a “self-positing of the I” (Fichte) disregarding the processes and rules of 
communicative acting.  
I want to argue that by abandoning and transforming the “older transcendental philosophy of 
mind”15 (Apel, 1988, p. 112, transl. M L), especially Kant’s theory of reason, Apel, in turn, loses 
possibilities and an apparatus to understand and explain – i.e. to become more conscious of – his 
own actions as a philosopher. Apel uses, without giving a proper account of it, (a) fourth- and (b) 
third-level architectonic ideas, a procedure that is not fully explicable by the transcendental 
pragmatism and that still requires the theoretical framework of the Kantian transcendental 
philosophy of mind to be understood. 
(a) First, consider the concept of an ideal communication community, which is one of the 
most central terms in Apel’s philosophical project. According to Apel, the ideal communication 
community is something that is always imagined and anticipated by every discourse participant. It is 
an ideal add-on to the real communication community. In all our argumentative communicative 
acts, even in a monologue, we must assume responsible and equal discourse partners who are 
principally able to reach consensus (cf. Apel, 1996, pp. 47-51, 235-236). The ultimate grounding of 
rationality, ethics and philosophy is possible because of the uncircumventability of the conditions of 
communication, and this includes the anticipation of an ideal communication community. 
Interestingly, this concept has, as Apel understands his own position, a status similar to the 
“regulative idea” in the Critique of Pure Reason. He states, the notion of ideal communication 
 
15  “[...] älteren Transzendentalphilosophie des Bewusstseins.” 
12 
 
community has “the character of a ‘regulative idea’, – to which, as Kant says, – ‘nothing congruent 
can be given in the senses’”16 (Apel, 1988, p. 101, transl. M L, cf. Apel, 1996, pp. 236-237). Apel 
does not, however, go as deeply into this topic as Kant scholars would wish him to do, and his 
insufficient analysis leads to at least two shortcuts: Firstly, Apel does not distinguish between 
practical and transcendental ideas and the corresponding functions of pure reason. The definition of 
ideas to which he refers is, as mentioned above, restricted to theoretical philosophy. But as Kant 
already puts it at the beginning of the transcendental dialectic: there is a difference between (1) 
something of which I can say “it is only an idea” (KrV, A 328 / B 384; Kant, 1998, p. 402) and (2) 
an idea as an indispensable condition for practical use of reason. Transcendental concepts of reason 
are indeed only ideas, insofar as we can, e.g., think of an infinite universe, but are incapable of 
imagining the absolute whole of all appearances in all its details. This is different from simple 
practical ideas. To act wisely, we must create a concept of wisdom. A wise decision is a decision 
made in accord with the idea of wisdom (see KrV, A 569 / B 597; Kant, 1998, p. 552). In the case of 
the practical use of our reason we can partially demonstrate the reality of a concept in our 
imperatives and real actions. The ideal communication community is therefore not a mere idea, but 
something which can be to some extent given in concreto, namely in the real communication 
community. Every participant in an argumentative discourse must presuppose and anticipate equal 
and reasonable conversation partners, and functioning philosophical or political debates 
demonstrate that this is not a mere idea. Thus, by not distinguishing different types of ideas, Apel 
misses the chance to recognise the actual potential of the Kantian theory of reason in the narrow 
sense and to get a broader understanding of the logic and the status of practically indispensable 
ideal presuppositions.17 Secondly, he does not reflect on the methodological function of the concept 
of the ideal communication community. This involves answering the question, which can be 
considered to be of a metaphilosophical or metatheoretical nature: What am I doing when I am 
introducing, explaining and putting forward a concept of reason? Two perspectives must be 
distinguished, the one of a rational agent, who bases his imperatives and actions on the idea of the 
ideal communication community, and this is also Apel himself communicating with his present and 
future readers in his works, and the one of an author (philosopher) who is creating and describing 
this idea in terms of his research. In the first case one can speak of a practical use of pure reason, in 
the second of a methodological use. The main purpose of the latter is not to act practically in 
accordance with an idea, but to produce scientific knowledge in relation to or resulting from it, i.e. 
 
16  “[...] den Charakter einer ‘regulativen Idee’, der – nach Kant – ‘nichts Empirisches völlig korrespondieren 
kann’.” 
17  Apel (1988, pp. 69-102) does instead seek for a way to combine the Kantian concept of the ideas (which are in 
his view all regulative and not given in concreto) with the Hegelian notion of reason given in the actuality. 
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to combine cognitions and arguments into a system under one or more (correlated) central pure 
concepts.  
(b) Hence, Apel is using (without realising it) his practical and methodological functions of 
pure reason within his project on the fourth level which are described in detail in the “older 
transcendental philosophy of mind” (Apel, 1988, p. 112). Moreover, the ideas of transcendental 
pragmatism and discourse ethics as parts of philosophy represent third-level architectonic 
principles. They both are archetypes of systems of knowledge pictured by their author at the outset. 
Each of these ideas, as Kant puts it, “lies in reason like a seed, all of whose parts still lie very 
involuted and are hardly recognizable even under microscopic observation” (KrV, A 834 / B 862; 
Kant, 1998, p. 692). Apel’s major works and published lectures are ectypes – efforts to impart his 
discoveries and cognitions based on fundamental ideas of research projects and positions (which are 
not yet, or only partially, given in experience). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The architectonic methodology is an important theory, not only regarding Kant as a historical 
person, but also in its own right, concerning its purposive content. It provides us with an apparatus 
to understand the logic of scientific practice in rational sciences, which can be developed further in 
contemporary contexts. As shown in the first section of this paper, Kant’s account of architectonic 
ideas is a part of his general inquiry into the nature of pure reason, which, being a mental faculty, is 
responsible for pure representations that serve as presuppositions, leaps ahead, demanding tasks for 
our will and our understanding. Their genuine methodological function that he describes in terms of 
an archetype-ectype-relation is the constructive conceptualisation of science as such, of rational 
sciences, their parts and certain basic ideas for the sake of planning, developing, acquiring and 
ordering of systematic knowledge. The further analysis in the second section has shown that it is 
possible to distinguish four planes of the continuously growing and expanding “universe of science” 
represented by architectonic ideas in Kant: (I) science as such as a systematic unity of all human 
knowledge; (II) the specific rational sciences, such as philosophy or jurisprudence; (III) the parts 
and directions within these sciences, such as ethics, metaphysics, transcendental philosophy, public 
law; (IV) all the different “ground-level” ideas like the invisible church, pure thinking or the social 
contract when they are explicitly considered as objects of studies. Finally, as pointed out, the 
postmodern critique or transformation of Kant’s concept of reason and the insistence on the 
necessity of abandoning the older epistemological research programmes may lead to a loss of 
14 
 
important knowledge.18 Karl-Otto Apel’s action as a philosophical author would not be possible 
without the methodological dimension of use of pure reason; it is without the ideas of discourse 
ethics, transcendental pragmatics and ideal communication community that represent third- and 
fourth-level architectonic ideas. 
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